Lords of Finance : The Bankers Who Broke the World (Pulitzer Prize Winner)
Lords of Finance : The Bankers Who Broke the World (Pulitzer Prize Winner)
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Author(s): Ahamed, Liaquat
ISBN No.: 9780143116806
Pages: 576
Year: 200912
Format: UK-B Format Paperback (Trade Paper)
Price: $ 30.36
Dispatch delay: Dispatched between 7 to 15 days
Status: Available

Contents introduction 1 PART ONE THE UNEXPECTED STORM AUGUST 1914 1. Prologue 19 2. A Strange and Lonely Man 23 3. The Young Wizard 35 4. A Safe Pair of Hands 45 5. L''Inspecteur des Finances 61 6. Money Generals 73 PART TWO AFTER THE DELUGE 1919-23 7. Demented Inspirations 99 8.


Uncle Shylock 130 9. A Barbarous Relic 155 PART THREE SOWING A NEW WIND 1923-28 10. A Bridge Between Chaos and Hope 179 11. The Dawes Opening 193 12. The Golden Chancellor 217 13. La Bataille 241 14. The First Squalls 270 15. Un Petit Coup de Whisky 291 PART FOUR REAPING ANOTHER WHIRLWIND 1928-33 16.


Into the Vortex 307 17. Purging the Rottenness 347 18. Magneto Trouble 374 19. A Loose Cannon on the Deck of the World 393 20. Gold Fetters 422 PART FIVE AFTERMATH 1933-44 21. Gold Standard on the Booze 451 22. The Caravans Move on 477 23. Epilogue 497 acknowledgments 506 notes 509 bibliography 533 index 545 INTRODUCTION On August 15, 1931, the following press statement was issued: "The Governor of the Bank of England has been indisposed as a result of the exceptional strain to which he has been subjected in recent months.


Acting on medical advice he has abandoned all work and has gone abroad for rest and change." The governor was Montagu Collet Norman, D.S.O.--having repeatedly turned down a title, he was not, as so many people assumed, Sir Montagu Norman or Lord Norman. Nevertheless, he did take great pride in that D.S.O after his name--the Distinguished Service Order, the second highest decoration for bravery by a military officer.


Norman was generally wary of the press and was infamous for the lengths to which he would go to escape prying reporters--traveling under a false identity; skipping off trains; even once, slipping over the side of an ocean vessel by way of a rope ladder in rough seas. On this occasion, however, as he prepared to board the liner Duchess of York for Canada, he was unusually forthcoming. With that talent for understatement that came so naturally to his class and country, he declared to the reporters gathered at dockside, "I feel I want a rest because I have had a very hard time lately. I have not been quite as well as I would like and I think a trip on this fine boat will do me good." The fragility of his mental constitution had long been an open secret within financial circles. Few members of the public knew the real truth--that for the last two weeks, as the world financial crisis had reached a crescendo and the European banking system teetered on the edge of collapse, the governor had been incapacitated by a nervous breakdown, brought on by extreme stress. The Bank press release, carried in newspapers from San Francisco to Shanghai, therefore came as a great shock to investors everywhere. It is difficult so many years after these events to recapture the power and prestige of Montagu Norman in that period between the wars--his name carries little resonance now.


But at the time, he was considered the most influential central banker in the world, according to the New York Times, the "monarch of [an] invisible empire." For Jean Monnet, godfather of the European Union, the Bank of England was then "the citadel of citadels" and "Montagu Norman was the man who governed the citadel. He was redoubtable." Over the previous decade, he and the heads of the three other major central banks had been part of what the newspapers had dubbed "the most exclusive club in the world." Norman, Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank, and Émile Moreau of the Banque de France had formed a quartet of central bankers who had taken on the job of reconstructing the global financial machinery after the First World War. But by the middle of 1931, Norman was the only remaining member of the original foursome. Strong had died in 1928 at the age of fifty-five, Moreau had retired in 1930, and Schacht had resigned in a dispute with his own government in 1930 and was flirting with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. And so the mantle of leadership of the financial world had fallen on the shoulders of this colorful but enigmatic Englishman with his "waggish" smile, his theatrical air of mystery, his Van Dyke beard, and his conspiratorial costume: broad-brimmed hat, flowing cape, and sparkling emerald tie pin.


For the world''s most important central banker to have a nervous breakdown as the global economy sank yet deeper into the second year of an unprecedented depression was truly unfortunate. Production in almost every country had collapsed--in the two worst hit, the United States and Germany, it had fallen 40 percent. Factories throughout the industrial world--from the car plants of Detroit to the steel mills of the Ruhr, from the silk mills of Lyons to the shipyards of Tyneside--were shuttered or working at a fraction of capacity. Faced with shrinking demand, businesses had cut prices by 25 percent in the two years since the slump had begun. Armies of the unemployed now haunted the towns and cities of the industrial nations. In the United States, the world''s largest economy, some 8 million men and women, close to 15 percent of the labor force, were out of work. Another 2.5 million men in Britain and 5 million in Germany, the second and third largest economies in the world, had joined the unemployment lines.


Of the four great economic powers, only France seemed to have been somewhat protected from the ravages of the storm sweeping the world, but even it was now beginning to slide downward. Gangs of unemployed youths and men with nothing to do loitered aimlessly at street corners, in parks, in bars and cafés. As more and more people were thrown out of work and unable to afford a decent place to live, grim jerry-built shantytowns constructed of packing cases, scrap iron, grease drums, tarpaulins, and even of motor car bodies had sprung up in cities such as New York and Chicago--there was even an encampment in Central Park. Similar makeshift colonies littered the fringes of Berlin, Hamburg, and Dresden. In the United States, millions of vagrants, escap- ing the blight of inner-city poverty, had taken to the road in search of some kind--any kind--of work. Unemployment led to violence and revolt. In the United States, food riots broke out in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and across the central and south-western states. In Britain, the miners went out on strike, followed by the cotton mill workers and the weavers.


Berlin was almost in a state of civil war. During the elections of September 1930, the Nazis, playing on the fears and frustrations of the unemployed and blaming everyone else--the Allies, the Communists, and the Jews--for the misery of Germany, gained close to 6.5 million votes, increasing their seats in the Reichstag from 12 to 107 and making them the second largest parliamentary party after the Social Democrats. Meanwhile in the streets, Nazi and Communist gangs clashed daily. There were coups in Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Spain. The biggest economic threat now came from the collapsing banking system. In December 1930, the Bank of United States, which despite its name was a private bank with no official status, went down in the largest single bank failure in U.S.


history, leaving frozen some $200 million in depositors'' funds. In May 1931, the biggest bank in Austria, the Creditanstalt, owned by the Rothschilds no less, with $250 million in assets, closed its doors. On June 20, President Herbert Hoover announced a one-year moratorium on all payments of debts and reparations stemming from the war. In July, the Danatbank, the third largest in Germany, foundered, precipitating a run on the whole German banking system and a tidal wave of capital out of the country. The chancellor, Heinrich Brüning, declared a bank holiday, restricted how much German citizens could withdraw from their bank accounts, and suspended payments on Germany''s short-term foreign debt. Later that month the crisis spread to the City of London, which, having lent heavily to Germany, found these claims now frozen. Suddenly, faced with the previously unthinkable prospect that Britain itself might be unable to meet its obligations, investors around the world started withdrawing funds from London. The Bank of England was forced to borrow $650 million from banks in France and the United States, including the Banque de France and the New York Federal Reserve Bank, to prevent its gold reserves from being completely depleted.


As the unemployment lines lengthened, banks shut their doors, farm prices collapsed, and factories closed, there was talk of apocalypse. On June 22, the noted economist John Maynard Keynes told a Chicago audience, "We are today in the middle of the greatest catastrophe--the greatest catastrophe due almost to entirely economic causes--of the modern world. I am told that the view is held in Moscow that this is the last, the culminating crisis of capitalism, and that our existing order of society will not survive it." The historian Arnold Toynbee, who knew a thing or two about the rise and fall of civilizations, wrote in his annual review of the year''s events for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, "In 1931, men and women all over the world were seriously contemplating and frankly discussing the possibility that the Western system of Society might break down and cease to work." During the summer a letter that M.


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