Introduction Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge 1. What RoboMary Knows, Daniel Dennett, Tufts University 2. So This is What it's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis, Laurence Nemirow, Davis Graham & Stubbs Income Tax, Benefits & Estate Group 3. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism, Frank Jackson, Australian National University, British Academy, Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and Fand Institut International de Philosophie 4. Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?, Torin Atler, The University of Alabama 5. What is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know About Color?, Knut Nordby, formerly University of Oslo and Telnor Communications, Research and Development Part II: Phenomenal Concepts 6. What is a Phenomenal Concept?, Janet Levin, University of Southern California 7. Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, David Papineau, King's College, Cambridge University 8.

Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint, Joseph Levine, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst 9. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, David Chalmers, Australian National University 10. Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia, John Hawthorne, Rutgers University 11. Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, Stephen White, Tufts University 12. Max Black's Ojbection to Mind-Brain Identity, Ned Block, New York University 13. Grasping Phenomenal Properties, Martine Nida-Rümelin, University of Fribourg.