In India, the "sugar lobby" is popularly blamed for all sugar price increases. This fascinating study of the growth of the sugar mill industry from India's independence to the present shows that there is actually more than one lobby, and rather than being united in a single entity, there is actually much conflict of interest between the various groups. Baru demonstrates that power--the ability to seek favor with the government--has shifted from the foreign-dominated companies to the large Indian business houses to the cooperative sector. Likewise, mill capacity has migrated steadily southward to the more agriculturally favorable tropical region. This process has, however, been monitored throughout by government policy which, Baru argues, has sought to protect the less economically viable northern region against both its southern rivals, from the demands of the cane growers and from the industry. This illuminating study of the growth of the political economy of sugar in India has far-reaching implications for the entire Indian economy, and for industry in developing countries and general.