1. Antitrust in a Market Economy1-1 Introduction1-2 Virtues of Competitive Markets1-2-1 The Invisible Hand1-2-2 Efficiency Properties1-3 The Monopoly Problem and Antitrust Response1-4 A Cautionary Note on Intervention1-5 Antitrust Policy in the "New Economy"2. The Case for Competition2-1 Conditions Conducive to Competition2-2 The Competitive Firm: Profit Maximization2-3 A Competitive Firm''s Short-Run Supply Curve2-4 Competitive Industry Supply in the Short Run2-5 Long-Run Profit Maximization2-6 Competitive Industry Equilibrium: Long Run2-7 Social Optimality of Competition2-8 A Noneconomic Argument for Competition3. The Case Against Monopoly3-1 Introduction3-2 Demand and Marginal Revenue Under Monopoly3-3 Short-Run Monopoly Profit Maximization3-4 Long-Run Monopoly Profit Maximization3-5 Monopoly Profit and Entry3-6 Welfare Effects of Monopoly3-7 The Dominant Firm3-8 Monopoly and Innovation3-9 Summary4. Antitrust Response to Monopoly4-1 Historical Background of Antitrust4-2 The Sherman Antitrust Act4-3 Legislative Intent of the Sherman Act4-4 Early Enforcement of the Sherman Act4-5 The Clayton Act4-6 The Federal Trade Commission Act4-7 Public Enforcement4-8 Antitrust Exemptions5. Private Enforcement5-1 Introduction5-2 Antitrust Standing5-3 Damages5-4 Class Actions and Parens Patriae5-5 Attorney''s Fees5-6 Settlements of Private Antitrust Suits6. Antitrust Building Blocks: Market Definition and Market Power6-1 Market Definition: General Principles6-2 Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines Criteria6-3 Market Definition: Evidence and Modern Approaches6-4 The Economics of Monopoly Power6-5 Relationship Between Market Definition and the Structural Determination of Market Power6-6 Monopoly Power in Practice6-7 Evaluating Entry and Expansion Barriers7. The Law of Monopolization7-1 Section 2 and Structural Monopoly7-2 The Legal Development of Monopolization7-3 Summary Standard for Illegal Monopolization7-4 Recent Supreme Court Decisions7-5 United States v.
Microsoft Corporation7-6 Attempts to Monopolize7-7 Conspiracies to Monopolize7-8 Antitrust Injury and Damages8. Exclusionary Practices8-1 Introduction8-2 The Economics of Predatory Pricing8-3 Empirical Evidence of Predatory Pricing8-4 Alternative Rules Against Predatory Pricing8-5 Predatory Pricing Cases8-6 Economic Feasibility of Recoupment8-7 Raising Rivals'' Costs8-8 Bundled Discounts8-9 Essential Facility Doctrine8-10 The Trinko Decision9. Collusion: Horizontal Price Fixing9-1 Cartel Theory9-2 The Problem of Entry9-3 The Problem of Cheating9-4 The Problem of Unequal Costs9-5 Partial Conspiracies9-6 Empirical Evidence9-7 Judicial Treatment of Price Fixing9-8 Applications of the Per Se Rule9-9 Economic Effects of Enforcement9-10 Summary10. Alternative Forms of Horizontal Collusion10-1 Economic Analysis of Market Division10-2 Judicial Treatment of Market Division10-3 Boycotts: An Economic Analysis10-4 Judicial Treatment of Boycotts10-5 Some Economic Aspects of Information10-6 Judicial Treatment of Data Dissemination11. Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion11-1 Some Simple Oligopoly Models11-2 The Antitrust Enforcement Dilemma11-3 Practices That Facilitate Tacit Collusion11-4 Case Development11-5 Summary Remarks12. Horizontal Mergers12-1 Introduction12-2 The Essence of Horizontal Mergers12-3 Merger Activity12-4 Incentives to Merge12-5 The Economic Foundations of Horizontal Merger Policy: Theory12-6 The Economic Foundations of Horizontal Merger Policy: Evidence12-7 Merger Policy12-8 Conclusion13. Price Discrimination13-1 The Economics of Price Discrimination13-2 The Law Concerning Price Discrimination13-3 Summary14. The Theory of Vertical Integration14-1 Introduction14-2 Vertical Integration with Competitive Markets14-3 Monopoly and Vertical Integration14-4 Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure14-5 Summary and Conclusions15.
Vertical Merger Policy15-1 Introduction15-2 Early Sherman Act Enforcement15-3 The Clayton Act Is Brought to Bear15-4 The Chicago School Prevails15-5 Foreclosure Redux15-6 Conclusion16. Maximum Resale Price Fixing16-1 Introduction16-2 Fixing Maximum Resale Prices: Economics16-3 Other Economically Equivalent Strategies16-4 The Albrecht Rule16-5 Albrecht Overruled by Khan16-6 Conclusion17. Resale Price Maintenance17-1 Introduction17-2 The Economics of RPM17-3 RPM: Judicial Analysis17-4 Antitrust Injury and Damages17-5 Some Final Thoughts18. Tying Arrangements18-1 Economic Analysis of Tying18-2 Judicial Treatment of Tying18-3 Public Policy Towards Tying19. Reciprocity19-1 Introduction19-2 Motivation for Reciprocity19-3 Conditions Conducive to Reciprocity19-4 Empirical Research on Reciprocity19-5 Economic Impact of Reciprocity19-6 Judicial Treatment of Reciprocity19-7 Concluding Comments20. Exclusive Dealing20-1 Introduction20-2 Economics of Exclusive Dealing20-3 The Legal Treatment of Exclusive Dealing20-4 Conclusion21. Territorial and Customer Restrictions21-1 Introduction21-2 Economic Incentives21-3 Empirical Evidence21-4 Legal Treatment of Vertical Territorial Restrictions21-5 Conclusion.