Does Aristotle consider happiness'' completion to be a single activity or, rather, does it involve several activities that together use all our powers and enjoy all kinds of goods. Is our end a perfect activity or, rather, a life that lacks nothing, including what from the noblest standpoint will include what is imperfect? What is the aim if time and other resources are scarce? Aristotle is arguing that if a single activity is ultimate it would use all our powers sufficiently, for if it did not we would still lack something -- unfulfilled desires, say, or truncated spiritedness or reason. The true issue is whether there is in fact such a single end or way of life, an issue that pervades his discussion. It is best now to suggest that one life, or one activity, the intellectual one as it considers the highest matters, is most noble, choiceworthy, and complete, but that it is not for everyone, for most lack the leisure and resources necessary for it. Aristotle discusses the link between happiness and intellectual virtue in the Ethics '' final book and describes there the elements of happiness more fully. Happiness is an activity choiceworthy for its own sake: it is the end of human concern. And, it is self-sufficient. Complete happiness, moreover, is the activity of what naturally rules and possesses intelligence about the whole and is the virtue belonging to the best.

This is contemplation, and intellectual virtue: it is intelligence about the noble and divine; it is the divine, or most divine, in us; it is the most continuous; it is the greatest pleasure; and it is the most self-sufficient -- the least in need of necessities or of others, even if it is better together with others. Ethical virtue, the next highest way of life, is less singular. It proves to be multiple in itself, for the peaks of practical life -- greatness of soul, justice, and friendship -- are not identical. Yet, even theoretical activity is restricted by necessities. And, although someone with contemplative excellence meets his necessities virtuously, it is unclear if he is sufficiently just (or friendly or magnanimous) if he does not also turn to political and ethical advising or founding. One activity is happiest -- both noble or choiceworthy in itself and least incomplete -- but only in the best circumstances for one with the fullest individual powers. Both ethical and intellectual virtue are outstanding and pleasurable and if they exist in their fullness, rare. Being rare (or striking or outstanding) and pleasant are, together with being fitting, elements of what is noble or beautiful.

True happiness is noble and complete: we choose it for its own sake; it is outstanding; it is fitting, because everything in virtue is measured or ''true,''; it is pleasant, because all virtuous activity is pleasant; and it is complete in its active use of our powers. Aristotle does not specify all these elements of the noble. He concentrates instead on its being for its own sake, and its being the completeness of our human work. The elements of pleasure, fit, and being rare or outstanding, however, become central in his understanding of the virtues. Ethical virtue is noble because it is prominent or rare (as greatness of soul), pleasurable, and measured. Let us consider further Aristotle''s statement about the three ways of life. Happiness as bodily pleasure does not differentiate us from other animals. We too nourish ourselves and perceive, but we also think.

Ethical virtue goes beyond animal perception because it involves choice and, therefore, reason''s directing the body and its enjoyments. Aristotle''s dismissing the view that happiness consists of bodily pleasure, however, does not mean that he ignores pleasure. On the contrary: one virtue, moderation, concerns the measured choice of bodily pleasures and both ethical and intellectual virtue are pleasant in their own way. Acting ethically is pleasant, and what is simply good is simply pleasant for those for whom what is good simply is good for them. Aristotle''s dismissing the opinion that happiness is devotion to bodily pleasure while acknowledging that each virtue (and not only moderation) is connected to pleasure distinguishes him from the modern view that happiness is the satisfaction of desire, the relief from unease, or the movement of desire from one object to another. This view suggests that pleasures are all commensurable. In Aristotle''s understanding, however, pleasures are differentiated by the activity that brings them, and what is good is not what satisfies undifferentiated desire or longing. To achieve the fullest happiness one cannot simply add pleasures, whatever their source.

Were all pleasures commensurable the pleasure from seeing three or six or ten flowers could equal the pleasure from hearing Delibes'' Flower Duet , or the pleasure from a jug of wine drunk quickly all by oneself could outweigh the pleasure from several generous acts. Such equating is based on views about desire and satisfaction that overturn or largely modify Aristotle''s view. We can best recognize and evaluate this change by beginning from his direct, visible, understanding. The substance of pleasure itself, and why pleasure seems sometimes to lead to unrestraint, are important questions for Aristotle. But his starting point and, commonsensically, ours, is to see the connection of different pleasures to different activities. (excerpted from chapter 1).