Excerpt from Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and PredationWe conclude these introductory remarks by contrasting our paper to three related literatures. The first is the recent game-theoretic work on predation.4 This literature shares with ours the feature that predation is rational. It differs, however, in that predation is viewed as an attempt to convince rivals that it would be unprofitable to remain in the industry; predation changes rivals' beliefs about industry demand or the predator's costs. In our paper, there is common knowledge that production in each period is a positive net present value investment.5 Thus, predation does not work by changing rivals' beliefs. Rather, predation adversely affects the agency relationship between the firm and its creditors.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books.

Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.