The cold war dominated international politics in the second half of the twentieth century. Before Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, few could ever have imagined a world without the East-West divide. Yet, six years later, the cold war was over. The Berlin Wall was down, Germany was reunited and Marxism-Leninism had been abandoned throughout Europe. How this happened is the main focus of the first half of this book. The author looks in detail at both internal and external factors precipitating change in Russia. Monocausal explanations are rejected. Instead, it is argued that the reason for change varied over time and across issue areas.

However, the book does emphasize the importance of Gorbachev and his reformist colleagues in initiating reform in the USSR and bringing the cold war to a peaceful end.The second half of the book looks at the post-soviet period when the initial euphoria over the end of communism gave way to growing unease both inside and outside Russia. Russian diplomacy in Yugoslavia and the war in Chechnya were just two of the most important prominent actions which led many Western commentators to accuse Moscow of adopting a more nationalist and aggressive foreign policy. However, the author argues that this shift in policy is easy to exaggerate. The brutal war in Chechnya was certainly a terrible warning of what could happen, but it remained untypical of policy during the Yeltsin period. A return to hostile relations with the West is not impossible, but it remains highly unlikely. For in contrast to the cold war period, both sides now agree on the principles of a liberal international order and this, rather than the current weakness of Russia, would seem to offer the best hope in the coming years for a co-operative, less antagonistic Russian policy towards it neighbours and the West.