Acknowledgments.- Credits.- List of abbreviations.- Introduction.- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States.- 1. Sensations and perceptions.- The objectivity of perceptual representation.
- Perceptual contents.- Sensory states and sensations.- 2. Two kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments.- Propositional attitudes as dispositions.- Propositional attitudes as commitments.- 3. Emotions.
- Emotions as sensations.- Emotions as evaluative judgments.- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes.- Emotions as perceptions of evaluative properties.- The borderline view of emotions.- 4. Summary.- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge.
- 1. First personal self-knowledge.- Groundlessness.- Transparency.- Authority.- 2. Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science? .- 3.
Third-personal self-knowledge.- 4. Summary.- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts.- 1. Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan.- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and Cassam.
- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon.- 4. Summary.- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts.- 1. Peacocke's rational internalism.- 2.
Burge's rational externalism.- 3. Evans' transparency method.- 3.1 Fernández' epistemic account.- 3.2 Moran's deliberative account.- 4.
Summary.- Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge.- 1. At the origins of expressivism: Wittgenstein.- 2. Bar-On's neo-expressivism.- 3. Summary.
- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories.- 1. The left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker.- 2. The right-to-left side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright.- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive Thesis: Bilgrami.- 4.
A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva.- The first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency.- Objections from empirical psychology.- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority.- 5. Summary.- Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge.- 1.
Propositional attitudes as commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts.- 2. Sensations, basic emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets expressivism.- Sensations.- Basic emotions.- Perceptions and perceptual experiences.- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions: third-personal self-knowledge.
- 4. Summary.- Appendix: Moore's Paradox.- 1. Moorean and Wittgensteinian analyses.- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of Moore's paradox.- 3.
What Moore's paradox isn't about: Jane's off case.- 4. What Moore's paradox is about-first pass.- 5. What Moore's paradox is about-second pass.- 6. An objection.- Notes.
- Bibliography.- Name index.- Subject index.