What does the work of Judith Shklar reveal to us about the proper role and limits of political theory? In particular, what are the implications of her arguments both for the way in which we should think of freedom and for the approach we should take to the resolution of moral conflicts? There is growing interest in Shklar's arguments, in particular the so-called 'liberalism of fear' characteristic of her mature work. She has become an important influence for those taking a sceptical approach to political thought and also for those concerned first and foremost with the avoidance of great evils. However, this book shows that the most important factor shaping her mature work is not her scepticism but rather a value monist approach to both moral conflict and freedom, and that this represents a radical departure from the value pluralism (and scepticism) of her early work. The book also advances a clear line of argument in defence of value pluralism in political theory, one that builds on but moves beyond Shklar's early work. Offering a challenging reassessment of an increasingly important thinker, this book will be of interest to students and scholars in the areas of political, moral and social theory, practical and applied ethics, political sociology and public and social policy.