Introduction PART I: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE OF THE FIRM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TRANSACTION COSTS, TEAM PRODUCTION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY Corporate Governance: A Contractual and Organizational Perspective Human-Asset Essentiality and Corporate Social Capital in a Stakeholders-Society Perspective Stakeholder Theory as a Basis for Capitalism Behavioral Economics, Federalism and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory Specific Investment and Corporate Law PART II: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT AND NORMATIVE RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND CSR Corporate Social Responsibility in a Market Economy: The Perspective of Constitutional Economics A Rawlsian View on CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): The Multi-stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance A Rawlsian View on CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium When Reputation is not Enough: Justifying Corporate Social Responsibility Rational Association and Corporate Responsibility PART III: CSR, REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION The Sustainable Corporation and its Governance: Long Run Performance and Social Responsibility The Role of Standardization, Certification and Assurance Service in Global Commerce PART IV: MODELS OF NON-PURELY SELF-INTERESTED ECONOMIC AGENTS AND THE INTRINISIC MOTIVATION FOR THE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF THE ORGANISATIONS Voluntary Co-determination Produces Sustainable Competitive Advantage Corporate Trust Games in Modern Knowledge Economies Effects of Different Stakeholder Groups' Strategic Control on Organizational Effectiveness and Well-being of Customers and Employees: An Empirical Investigation Trusting, Trustworthiness and CSR: Some Experiments and Implications.