From the reviews: "Degrees of Belief is a strong collection of essays distinguished by its inclusion of an unusually wide array of approaches to understanding its subject. the book is best suited for formally proficient advanced students (graduate or upper-level undergraduate) or professionals seeking to explore other approaches to degree of belief than the ones in which they currently work. Degrees of Belief is an excellent springboard for exploring the many approaches to degrees of belief currently being investigated in the literature." (Lyle Zynda, Metascience, Vol. 21, 2012) "This is a fascinating collection that brings together issues in traditional and formal epistemology, and succeeds in posing new challenges for both. Especially notable are the arguments for and against attempted justification of probability representations of opinion, with special reference to self-locating beliefs and rules for updating." Bas C. van Fraassen, San Francisco State University "This is a splendid collection of essays on degrees of belief.

Contributions are from the leading figures in the field, and, consequently, it contains an authoritative survey and assessment of current accounts of degrees of belief. [.] the essays are so clear and general that the book also provides an excellent overview of the field for the non-expert." Frank Arntzenius, University College, Oxford University "Modern Bayesian probabilism sometimes seems under threat from two fronts. Some theorists think that Bayesians can't make sense of traditional concepts such as belief and knowledge. Other theorists think that restrictions on degrees of belief given by probability theory are too restrictive. This collection includes state of the art work on both of these challenges, with both the challenges and the responses well represented. Anyone interested in formal epistemology, or in the implications of formal epistemology for philosophy in general, should read this collection.

" Brian Weatherson, Rutgers University.