The Cool War Excerpt from Chapter 5 With the first missile strikes, Putin publicly announced that the assault was prompted by "tragic events taking place in the Donbass" and the "expansion of the NATO bloc to the east, bringing its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders." He decried the collapse of the Cold War order that the Soviet Union presided over, justified the assault by comparing it to NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE, and decried the use of force in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Putin then likened all of this activity to the functional equivalent of Nazi German designs on the Soviet Union in the 1940s. In his speech, Putin issued a nuclear threat, reiterated his concern about NATO infrastructure, and decried NATO as an instrument of American power. He blamed the West for supporting "extreme nationalists and neo-Nazis in Ukraine." Given the alleged danger to the people in the so-called Donetsk People''s Republic and Luhansk People''s Republic, "I decided to conduct a special military operation" to "protect people who have been subjected to bullying and genocide." He then used Article 1 and Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify this. The visible response of American nuclear forces to developments on 24 February initially included the deployment of B-52s from RAF Fairford to orbit areas over Poland opposite Kaliningrad, and over Sweden.

These covered Russian nuclear forces in that enclave and south of St Petersburg. This move was accompanied by the deployment of four E-6B Mercuries over the United States to include ALCS-equipped aircraft in proximity to the ICBM fields, and a COBRA BALL over North Dakota. Later in the day, E-4B code-named ORDER66 took off from Lincoln, Nebraska. The callsign of this E-4B Nightwatch referenced Star Wars Episode III: The Revenge of the Sith film in which a secret order is given to senior military personnel by the Emperor to execute his opposition. Russian moves did not correspond to patterns established up to this point in the crisis. A VIP Tu-214 flew to Nur Sultan, but was likely a diplomatic flight. An Il-96-300PU command post aircraft flew from Moscow to Dushanbe, while a Tu-214PU-SUS command post aircraft flew from Moscow into uncontrolled airspace in Kazakhstan. These last two moves suggest that the Putin regime dispersed nuclear command and control resources into CSTO countries that they knew would not be targeted by the United States.

The Kazakhstan deployment of this unique aircraft is significant in that it was geographically positioned to communicate with the three mobile ICBM divisions of the 33rd Guards Missile Army in eastern Russia while operating inside Kazakh airspace. It was the French, however, who responded publicly first. Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was asked by media of he thought Putin was making a nuclear threat, Le Drian said.: "Yes, I think that Vladimir Putin must also understand that the Atlantic alliance is a nuclear alliance. " Conclusions The year began with British signalling using a ballistic missile submarine to underscore resolve during a period of intense international diplomacy in the face of the massive Russian military build up opposite Ukraine. Unexpectedly, there were several major and concurrent destabilizing events in January in addition to Ukraine: the unrest in Kazakhstan; North Korean flirtations with intercontinental delivery systems; and Russia''s use of hybrid methods against NATO members and neutral Baltic countries as a possible distraction from the Ukraine operation. The American response involved exercising its nuclear command and control apparatus, revealing the location of submarines, and exposing Russian plans for a "false flag" event. The Russian response was increasing the visible training tempo of its strategic missile forces and establishing a Russian nuclear umbrella over Belarus.

These moves were supported with enhanced information operations. Russian Long Range Aviation was also employed to increase the pressure on NORAD, especially during an internal crisis in Canada that was aggravated by Russian hybrid methods. Other Russian military activities made it clear by the end of February that there was a coordinated effort to pressurize and distract NATO by operating in its "rear area." These activities were backed by significant strategic nuclear force movements, including the GROM 2022 exercise. Collectively, these activities amount to implementation of the Russian definition of deterrence, that is, compellence. The message was: stay out of the Ukraine situation. Deploying British and American ISR aircraft over Ukraine throughout this period was by no means the equivalent of deploying B-52s over Mariupol and P-8s over the Sea of Azov for deterrence signalling. There were no attempts at this point to establish that Ukraine was under an American, British, or French nuclear umbrella in the way Russia blatantly did so over Belarus.

When it came to hybrid methods directed at NATO members, however, the American response was proportionate to the activity and employed assurance signalling. This included, for example, the deployment of B-52s off Norway, over Sweden, and then Poland to cover Russian nuclear systems in Kaliningrad pointed at NATO countries. Probably nothing short of blatantly introducing nuclear-capable systems or military forces from NATO in or over Ukraine would have deterred Russia from mounting the next phase of its invasion. And that would have given the Putin regime confirmation of its worldview as well as the casus belli it wanted. Indeed, years of successful Russian information warfare directed against NATO members ensured there could be no prompt response along these lines. By exercising its strategic nuclear forces away from the conflict area, and by conducting limited signalling with theatre forces like the F-16 DCA units away from the conflict area, the United States used assurance signalling that it was prepared to respond if the Russian leadership chose to expand operations outside of Ukraine or involve the smaller NATO members closer to Russia. In the end however, any indications of a Russian military move against NATO members during this period was a distraction from the main event, though they likely had contingency plans to conduct "humanitarian interventions" in the Russian-speaking areas of the Baltic countries if the opportunity arose to exploit the situation. The Putin regime retained the initiative in part due to confidence, even though they had been thrown off by the "false flag" revelations.

That confidence existed because of its strategic nuclear forces and their unbridled use for signalling and coercion. Strategic nuclear arsenals cancelled each other out, Russian theatre nuclear forces offset NATO theatre nuclear forces, and there was no deterrent umbrella over Ukraine, thus making eastern Europe safe for conventional warfare. None of the Russian activity stopped vital military aid from being delivered to Ukraine in the weeks before the 23-24 February assault. Russia''s coordinated activities did, however, set up the Western information ecosystem and make it susceptible to "nuclear fear" information operations.