Introduction: toward re-enchantment; 1. The human form of life; 1.1 Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism: the disenchanted version; 1.2 The human difference: rationality; 1.3 The standpoint from within our human form of life: the space of meaning; 1.4 Strong evaluative meaning; 1.5 Going further: the way forward; 2. Virtue, happiness, and meaning; 2.

1 The instrumentalist account; 2.2 The constitutive account: strong evaluative version; 2.3 The constitutive account: weak evaluative version; 2.4 Virtue apart from happiness?; 2.5 Virtue, loss, and the meaning of life; 3. Other-regarding concern; 3.1 MacIntyre on other-regarding concern; 3.2 Intrinsic worth: dignity and sanctity; 3.

3 Fully amongst us: solidarity with the severely afflicted and other marginalized humans; 3.4 Moral absolutes; 3.5 Spheres of other-regarding concern: universal and particular; 4. Cosmic outlooks; 4.1 Hursthouse's three theses and Williams' challenge; 4.2 Identifying what is noblest and best; 4.3 Against quietism: the need for a moral ontology; 4.4 Rival cosmic outlooks; 4.

5 A poker-faced universe?; 5. Homo Religiosus; 5.1 What is spirituality?; 5.2 What kind of naturalism?; 5.3 Human beings as Homo Religiosus; 5.4 The contemplative life; 5.5 Theistic spirituality; 5.6 Objections and replies; Conclusion.