Chapter One Liberation As the world watched the enormous statue of Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti being pulled down in Iraq's Firdus Square on April 9, 2003, the logical impression was that the repressive Baathist regime had ended and that Iraq now stood at the doorway of a new era. Though it looked quite substantial, the statue was merely a hollow shell bolted to upright steel shafts running up the legs. Like Iraq itself, the great monument fell far more easily than expected. The Iraqi army had melted away under the destructive wrath of Operation Cobra II,1 which unfolded with surprising speed and momentum.2In the face of the military onslaught, the ruling Baath Party leaders either were killed or fled like startled rabbits and went into hiding. As Baghdad was liberated from the Baathist regime, thousands of Iraqis danced in the streets. For more than three de cades, the Iraqi people had lived in the shadow of the dictator referred to by his given name, Saddam. (After the Iraqi custom, Saddam's second name, Hussein, was his father's first name, and his third name, al-Tikriti, indicated his place of birth.

) Saddam's image and will hung over the citizenry like a cloud of rancid cigar smoke. The Iraqi people could seemingly never escape his gaze as he looked down from the thousands of murals and portraits across the country. One Marsh Arab on the outskirts of Nassiriyah described the repressive malaise: "When Saddam was in office, we used to be afraid of the walls."3 As they toppled Saddam's regime, the coalition soldiers felt they had given a great gift of freedom to the Iraqi people. Though many Iraqis were in fact grateful, they remained uneasy about the future. They urged their new American friends to come back when "the real Baghdad" is reborn- a place of vibrant markets, parties, feasts, and family gatherings. One of the authors of this book (Michael Newton) was in Baghdad in December 2003, just eight months after the invasion. First-person references in this chapter are to him.

ONE OF THE FIRST Iraqis I encountered was a striking, dark-haired young college student who was working for the American administrators as an interpreter. When I asked her what she planned to do with her life after Saddam, she simply shrugged. All that she had known in her lifetime was an Iraq where privilege and tribe and power trumped hard work and individual innovation at every turn. The children of Baath Party officials enjoyed bonus points on their college exams and hence obtained admission to the schools of their choice. She explained to me that she had never imagined that her future could be determined by her dreams. It was only after some prodding and a sustained effort to gain her trust that the young student began to admit to the life goals and dreams that she had long repressed or dismissed as unattainable. She talked of boys and clothes and travel. She wavered between wanting a career in the fashion industry and one as a caterer, and it was in the very expression of her personal ambitions that the shimmering possibilities of a new Iraq became tangible and real.

In those first months after the fall of Saddam, a better life seemed so attainable for ordinary people. I listened as ordinary citizens began to tell me of their hopes after escaping the shackles of Baath Party ru≤ such words would have endangered their lives just months before. People told me of family members who had disappeared or fled under Saddam's iron fist, while showing me worn pictures of their loved ones. One older woman secretively sought me out to ask whether the persecution of Christians could be prosecuted as a crime against humanity and to discuss freedom of religion and belief. This early period of the occupation later came to be called the "golden months" because anything seemed possible. When confronted with the 2006 Iraq Study Group observation that "pessimism is pervasive," one administrator nostalgically harkened back to the early spring of 2003, a time in which "optimism was omnipresent." The victorious coalition had a brief period of unopposed opportunity to establish the building blocks of a new and better society. At the same time, the uncertainty that people felt about their future and the deep societal scars that remained even after the Baathist power structures imploded made it plain that the transition to a peaceful and democratic Iraq, positioned to enjoy the fruits of freedom, would be arduous and bumpy at best.

To close observers, it soon became clear that pre-invasion assumptions about the ease with which Iraq could suddenly become an island of prosperity and peace by transitioning into institutionalized norms of democratic governance had melted like ice in the withering summer heat. The Bush administration had pointedly decided early on that the U.S. military should not be in the business of "nation building." American planners had spent the most time on what turned out to be the least difficult task-defeating the Iraqi army. Very little planning had been devoted to the most daunting challenge-building a new democratic Iraq in the face of a mounting insurgency. The paradox of prewar planning was that there were far too few U.S.

forces to secure and protect the hundreds of suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites, much less to prevent WMDs from being smuggled out of Iraq or being transferred to the terrorist groups; the preemption of such transfers had been one of the very purposes for the war.4 In the run-up to the war, the Americans largely failed to anticipate an extended presence or the need to engage in institution building from the ground up. The images of widespread looting in Baghdad lingered; American forces had been too thinly stretched to protect the treasures of the National Museum. Nor could they seal the borders with Iran or Jordan. coalition forces worked with little strategic guidance or concerted focus. Superficial progress was nevertheless rapid. Freedom of the press was quickly restored; soon, 75 radio stations, 180 newspapers, and 10 television stations were established. Cell phone subscriptions exploded as Iraqis realized they could talk with each other without fear of being jailed.

Satellite television was introduced to Iraq. During Saddam's era, anyone caught with a satellite dish was imprisoned and forced to pay a fine of 100 dinars. Iraqi lawyers later apologized that the regime had prevented them from remaining aware of current legal developments, and they thirsted to catch up to the most modern conceptions. Plans were made to reopen the Baghdad Stock Exchange, and soon realized in June 2004. Western civilians flowed in to staff the coalition Provisional Authority, headquartered in Saddam's ostentatious Republican Palace on the banks of the Euphrates. At the same time, Saddam's shadow loomed in the consciousness of the people as his whereabouts remained a deep mystery. No one had seen him since the fast-moving armor of the U.S.

Third Infantry Division had thundered toward Baghdad. Despite the trappings of progress, ordinary Iraqis remained bound in a sense of growing unease and disbelief. As early as May 18, 2003, one of the most respected judges on the U.S. federal bench wrote during a visit to Iraq that "calm is slowly returning but families are still afraid.… Most of all they are afraid of an unknown future, afraid that Saddam will return or that the country will dissolve into anarchy because the Americans won't stay the course."5 The insurgency became more organized and effective in conducting random acts of violence. Foreign fighters poured into the country with the express aim of killing and maiming Iraqi citizens to defeat the coalition forces by showing the limits of their strength.

As summer bled into fall, more than three hundred American ser vice members had been killed.6 The guarded optimism that flowered during the spring of 2003 faded into a residue of uncertainty reminiscent of the fear that many Iraqis had experienced under the tyranny of the Baathist regime. Saddam remained at large as the tectonic plates of Iraqi society began to grind against the realities of running a nation and reestablishing order that could contain sectarian and tribal rivalries. Internecine arguments increased as the Interim Governing Council (IGC) that had been quickly appointed by the occupation authorities began to meet. Rival political organizations quickly formed and jockeyed against each other in preparation for the inevitable rounds of elections that would distribute power. In many areas, the fissures that ran along tribal loyalty, family bonds, and religious perspective became the poles that attracted political support. Against this backdrop, the people of Iraq sustained a deep and visceral need to expose the crimes of the regime and witness an accounting for their suffering. THE MANHUNT American forces began to plan and execute a series of raids to capture or kill the leading Baath Party leaders who had escaped during the lightning-fast invasion of Iraq.

Saddam was depicted as the ace of spades in the pack of cards handed out to deploying American soldiers. The ace ran wild as a succession of operations designed to capture him failed. Saddam had built his career on his persona as the symbol of a unified and proud Iraq standing up to the Americans and the United Nations. The resourcefulness of the Iraqi leader was legendary, and his ruthless drive to retain and regain power was almost mythical to the Iraqi people. Most knew that the allies had sought to kill him with specially planned military strikes during the war-yet, he survived and was still at large. Iraqis wondered if the charisma and drive of the leader whose entire image had been built on defiance of the United States could somehow be enough to propel him to recapture his throne and resume his domination of Iraqi society. The undercurrent of.