Introduction Fatma is from Bar-al Canoon, a small village in Southern Lebanon, where more than 18,000 soldiers are deployed under the United Nations flag. At the end of my first interview with her in 2007, she asked a striking question: "Why, Chiara, do we need all these soldiers to bring peace?" While this book may not be able to answer Fatma''s seemingly simple but ultimately complex question, it does recognize the crucial role that military organizations play in international peace and stability operations, and tries to better understand the dynamics that influence military behavior on the ground. At the time of writing, more than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Another 300,000 are deployed under the auspices of regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Soldiers in these missions are important actors, with significant responsibility for implementing peace and stability operations--and a corresponding influence on the goals and impact of peacekeeping missions. Yet we know surprisingly little about the factors that influence soldiers'' behavior. In an attempt to address this gap, this book examines the behavior of military organizations in peace and stability operations. Soldiers deployed in multinational peace and stability operations are typically assigned to a specific area--called an Area of Operations (AO) or Area of Responsibility in military parlance--along with other soldiers from their country of origin.

In their AO, soldiers are expected to implement a specific mandate to keep or enforce peace, in accordance with their rules of engagement (ROE). Usually, they are equipped with weapons. They may also have some responsibility for delivering humanitarian aid and maintaining control of their assigned territory. Their day-to-day tasks can vary widely, and could include, for example, conducting patrols, neutralizing improvised explosive devices, delivering humanitarian aid, organizing meetings with the village chief, launching programs to benefit vulnerable groups, and conducting combat operations against specific targets. Mandates and standard operating procedures (SOPs) must be interpreted and executed. In contrast to conventional military operations, which have precise tactical objectives such as fighting or holding terrain, soldiers in contemporary peace and stability operations have a wider range of responsibilities with significantly greater room to maneuver. Given the relative autonomy of action of national contingents in peace operations, it is perhaps unsurprising to find that different national contingents interpret and implement identical mandates in a given mission in very different ways. Despite strong anecdotal evidence of such differences in interpretation, the factors that influence and impact soldiers'' behavior have never been systematically studied in the literatures on peace operations or in the field of military studies.

The existing literature on peace operations has indeed analyzed the different conditions under which peace operations can be successful, and has elaborated sophisticated ways of measuring what influences durable peace, but it has neglected the variable of soldiers'' or contingents'' behavior. This lack of attention is particularly pertinent in light of the recent finding that deploying troops, rather than military observers or police, in a peacekeeping operation affects the protection of civilians. Similarly, soldiers'' behavioral variations may have important consequences on the level of violence against civilians, the local population''s perceptions of the mission, soldiers'' propensity to coordinate with other actors, and eventually the prospects for conflict resolution. That different armies behave differently in war is a recurring classical theme in military studies. More recently, sociologist Joseph Soeters has launched a new research program that systematically examines cross-national variations. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that different armies behave differently in the same peace operation. For instance, in the UN mission in Lebanon, operating under the same regional command and implementing the same mandate, Indian troops conducted foot patrols and organized popular yoga classes, while the Korean units used high force protection measures and conducted patrols strictly in armored vehicles. Why do some military contingents prioritize humanitarian activities, while others prioritize operational activities when deployed under very similar conditions? No previous study has systematically examined the differences in peacekeeping practices in multinational missions and what might explain them.

The first aim of this book is to systematically document variations in soldiers'' tactical behavior in peace operations. I borrow Stephen Biddle''s concept of "force employment" to denote such variations. The force employment variable includes all activities carried out by soldiers in peace operations--force protection, patrols (including levels of armament, timing and types of patrols), interactions with local military forces and civilians, as well as command and control. This book also uses a concept derived from the literature on military effectiveness, which I call Unit Peace Operation Effectiveness (UPOE), to categorize and compare how different armies behave. UPOE does not analyze the impact or consequences of military behavior. Rather, by assessing how good military units are at doing certain things, it evaluates how likely it is that their behavior will have particular intended consequences on the ground. The impact and consequences of such actions, however, are very hard to discern because of several other potential confounding factors. Therefore, I limit myself here to evaluating units'' behavior using the concept of UPOE.

The book''s second (and central) objective is to explain the determinants of behavioral variations. I argue that an important factor influencing soldiers'' tactical behavior is the military culture of their home army, on which I elaborate in my next section. Military Cultures, Domestic Political Configurations, and Force Employment Militaries are a special kind of organization, often referred to by scholars and practitioners as "total institutions." Compared to other organizations or state bureaucracies, members of the military are bound together by higher levels of cohesion, hierarchy, and discipline, which are linked to their organization''s core function of exercising the state''s monopoly over the use of violence. Becoming a member of a military organization requires individuals to become socialized into a very specific set of practices, beliefs, routines, and rituals. In this book, military culture is defined as a core set of beliefs, attitudes, and values that, through processes of socialization, become deeply embedded within an army and guide the way in which it manages its internal and external lives, interprets its tactical and operational objectives, and learns and adapts. It operates as a filter between domestic political configurations and the way the military behaves in the field. While conventional military operations are guided by tactical manuals that provide detailed behavioral prescriptions, there is more room for interpretation in peace and stability operations.

Soldiers on such missions must decide, for example, how to behave when patrolling, how to interact with the local population, and how to protect themselves from enemy attacks. In this book, I argue that it is military culture that influences the way soldiers exercise their freedom of action and behave at the tactical level on peace and stability operations. When a military unit deploys, its military culture goes with it. I argue that the values and beliefs that constitute this military culture influence the unit''s perceptions as it enters the AO by shaping soldiers'' interpretations of a number of factors of importance for their behavior on the ground: the perceptions of the local context, the perceptions of abstract concepts related to the operations (such as peace), and perceptions relating to organizational variables. For instance, units from different countries in the same AO may or may not perceive the "enemies" as easily identifiable and may understand the nature of their mission as a counterinsurgency or a peacekeeping mission. These perceptions, in turn, guide the choices made by active units in the field, within the boundaries of the freedom of maneuver left to the unit after the mission mandate, actual material conditions, and threat levels have been considered. In sum, I document that these perceptions are strongly consistent with the way soldiers behave and their respective military cultures. When soldiers are abroad, they are usually deployed as units.

Notwithstanding the level of heterogeneity across army unit cultures, this book focuses on military culture in countries'' armies. This is because, a priori, the set of beliefs, attitudes, and values of an army''s military culture seems to have the greatest influence on soldiers'' behavior, through their socialization into the specificities of the service, frequent rotations, and basic and advanced training. I studied several units from different armies and detected common patterns across units of the same army. Empirically, specific unit cultures only account for some residual variation. Ultimately, I am interested in understanding what influences force employment and UPOE--that is, why military units behave the way they do and how this might influence their ability to keep peace. But doing so requires finding out where military culture comes from , a topic long neglected by the literature on military culture. And I show empirically that military cultures do not emerge from nowhere. For the.