"One of the most significant developments in international law in the past decades has been the rise of institutionalized international tribunals - like the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms, various EU courts, and the International Criminal Court - that can enforce international law against states. The Limits of Leviathan employs economic theories of contract formation and enforcement to explain the rise and operation of these institutions. Scott and Stephan show how a combination of formal institutional sanctions and more traditional informal sanctioning methods (such as retaliation and reputational loss) work together to foster cooperation among nations. They also provide a framework for explaining how institutionalized enforcement can go too far and retard cooperation among nations. The Limits of Leviathan is a realistic, hard-nosed examination of the promise and perils of international enforcement institutions, and an important contribution to the burgeoning use of social science methodologies to explain international relations." Jack L. Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law Schoollain international relations.

" Jack L. Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law Schoollain international relations." Jack L. Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law Schoollain international relations." Jack L. Goldsmith, Henry L.

Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.