Unit 1: Fundamental Issues in Morality Issue: Is Moral Relativism Correct? YES: Torbjörn Tännsjö , from "Moral Relativism," Philosophical Studies (2007) NO: Louis P. Pojman , from "The Case Against Moral Relativism," in The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature , Oxford University Press (2007) Torbjörn Tännsjö distinguishes among several types of relativism and argues in favor of one of them, which he calls "ontological relativism." According to this view, two people may disagree radically on a moral question, and yet both may be right, because each of them inhabits a different socially-constructed moral universe. Louis Pojman carefully distinguishes what he calls the diversity thesis--that moral rules differ from society to society--from ethical relativism. The diversity thesis is a straightforward description of what are acknowledged differences in the moral beliefs and practices of various human groups. But he argues that moral relativism does not follow from this diversity. Issue: Does Morality Need Religion? YES: C. Stephen Layman , from "Ethics and the Kingdom of God," in The Shape of the Good: Christian Reflections on the Foundations of Ethics , University of Notre Dame Press (1991) NO: John Arthur , from "Religion, Morality, and Conscience," in Morality and Moral Controversies , Prentice Hall (1996) Philosopher C.
Stephen Layman argues that morality makes the most sense from a theistic perspective and that a purely secular perspective is insufficient. The secular perspective, Layman asserts, does not adequately deal with secret violations, and it does not allow for the possibility of fulfillment of people''s deepest needs in an afterlife. Philosopher John Arthur counters that morality is logically independent of religion, although there are historical connections. Religion, he believes, is not necessary for moral guidance or moral answers; morality is social. Unit 2: Sex, Marriage, and Reproduction Issue: Is Casual Sex Immoral? YES: Meg Lovejoy , from "Explaining Why the Practice [Hooking Up] Is More Costly than Beneficial," in Is Hooking Up Empowering for College Women? A Feminist Gramscian Perspective , Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University (2012) NO: Raja Halwani , from "Casual Sex," in Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia , Greenwood Press (2005) Analyzing interviews with female college students enabled Meg Lovejoy to state clearly the advantages and disadvantages of sex without commitment for young women. The disadvantages, including fear of pregnancy and STDs, reduced self-esteem, and thwarted desire for intimacy, outweigh the advantages such as immediate pleasure.
Raja Halwani first discusses the difficulties involved in defining casual sex precisely. He next examines a number of objections to casual sex and concludes that casual sex need not be morally wrong because each of these objections involves factors that are not, for the most part, specifically intrinsic to casual sex. Issue: Is Abortion Immoral? YES: Mary Meehan , from "Why Liberals Should Defend the Unborn," Human Life Review (2011) NO: Amy Borovoy , from "Beyond Choice: A New Framework for Abortion?" Dissent (2011) Meehan argues that the unborn are exactly the kind of vulnerable population traditionally defended by liberals. She discusses a number of factors in support of this connection, such as scientific claims about when life begins, the obligations that arise from the act of conception, the disproportionate impact of abortion on poor women and women of color, and issues relating to disability rights and the environment. Borovoy argues that the traditional defense of abortion, which opposes the choice of the woman against the life of the fetus, does not effectively capture the unique experience of pregnancy, and finds inspiration for a more satisfying approach in Japanese culture, where the decision whether or not to have an abortion is contextualized in the woman''s responsibility not only to her fetus but to her family. Issue: Is It Morally Right to Prohibit Same-Sex Marriage? YES: Helen M. Alvaré , from "Brief of Amicus Curiae Helen M. Alvaré in Support of Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group," in Hollingsworth v.
Perry, U.S. v. Windsor , Supreme Court of the United States (2013) NO: The American Psychological Associations et al. , from "Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance in Hollingsworth v. Perry ," Supreme Court of the United States (2013) Law professor Helen Alvaré argues that the state''s interest in promoting opposite-sex marriage stems from its interest in the procreation of children by opposite-sex married couples. Moreover, Alvaré traces the decline of marriage to the loss of traditional connections among marriage, sex, and children. State recognition of same-sex marriage would further undermine these connections and thus contribute to the destabilization of marriage, with negative repercussions to society, especially among the poor.
Therefore, she argues, the state has an interest in prohibiting same-sex marriage. The American Psychological Association joins together with a number of other groups to argue that the substantial benefits that accrue to married couples should not be denied to same-sex couples. Citing evidence in favor of the ability of same-sex couples to form stable, long-lasting committed relationships, they argue that denying marriage to same-sex couples unfairly stigmatizes and discriminates against them. Issue: Is it Immoral to Clone Human Beings? YES: Michael J. Sandel , from "The Ethical Implications of Human Cloning," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine (2005) NO: John A. Robertson , from "Human Cloning and the Challenge of Regulation," The New England Journal of Medicine (1998) Political philosopher Michael J. Sandel argues that much of the talk about cloning revolves around a few limited concepts (e.g.
, rights, autonomy, and the supposed unnaturalness of asexual reproduction) that are inadequate and fail to express what is really wrong with cloning. We need, instead, to address fundamental questions about our stance toward nature. Law professor John A. Robertson maintains that there should not be a complete ban on human cloning but that regulatory policy should be focused on ensuring that it is performed in a responsible manner. Unit 3: Law and Society Issue: Is Paid Organ Donation Morally Permissible? YES: Michael B. Gill and Robert M. Sade , from "Paying for Kidneys: The Case Against Prohibition," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (2002) NO: Anya Adair and Stephen J. Wigmore , from "Paid Organ Donation: The Case Against," Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England (2011) Michael B.
Gill and Robert M. Sade argue that since there are no moral prohibitions against donating kidneys for transplantation or selling blood plasma, there should be no moral prohibition against selling kidneys for transplantation. They further argue that selling a kidney does not violate a person''s dignity and that a system in which a person can receive payment for a kidney is not inherently exploitive. Anya Adair and Stephen J. Wigmore argue that paid organ donation as currently practiced exploits the donors. They point to specific exploitive practices, such as withholding sufficient information for the donors to give truly informed consent. Further, they argue, any attempt to repair inequities in the system is doomed to failure because of the inherent inequity; only those under severe economic constraints will ever be willing to sell their organs. Issue: Do Anti-Smoking Policies Violate Smokers'' Moral Autonomy? YES: Lewis Maltby , from "Whose Life Is It Anyway? Employer Control of Off Duty Smoking and Individual Autonomy," William Mitchell Law Review (2008) NO: Adrien Barton , from "How Tobacco Health Warnings Can Foster Autonomy" Public Health Ethics (2013) Lewis Maltby analyzes the growing trend among employers to reduce health-care costs by regulating their employees'' off-duty behavior, including requiring employees not to smoke.
He argues that this trend is intrusive and unfair, and links it to national anti-smoking policies, which, he also believes, intrude on people''s right to do what they want in their own homes. Adrien Barton argues that ads that try to persuade people to stop smoking may seem to act against autonomy by telling them what they should do. However, since nicotine addiction takes autonomy away, helping people not to break the addiction helps to restore that autonomy. Issue: Is Torture Ever Morally Justified? YES: Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke , from "Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable," University of San Francisco Law Review (2005) NO: Christopher Kutz , from "Torture, Necessity, and Existential Politics," California Law Review