On 5 April, at the magnificent funeral for the martyrs of the revolution, Tsereteli travelled through the million-strong crowd in a vehicle he shared with Vera Figner. She was greeted with such warmth along the whole route that it seemed as if everyone knew her personally: many approached and pressed her hand. Her eyes sparkled with happiness: a liberated people remembered and was paying honour to that comrade-in-arms of Zhelyabov and Perovskaya! Irakli was deeply moved--he had not expected young revolutionary faith and enthusiasm like this from the countless demonstrators! But what an irony! It was not on any ordinary day but on that particular day of national solemnities, one night after the EC had, with such great difficulty, overturned the internationalists and moved to support national defence--it was on that day that Milyukov gave his brazen interview about the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, about the expulsion of Turkey from Europe and about the Straits. Was he mocking the revolutionaries, and the 27 March Manifesto? That evening the Liaison Commission met at the Mariinsky Palace, with the government. (Skobelev and Nakhamkes brought thick briefcases with them, but they were stuffed with newspapers and useless documents.) Tsereteli studied the faces and mannerisms of the ministers--he had met none of them before. He decided they were, for all their surface amiability, circumspect underneath. There was nothing to be done about it--they were representatives of the bourgeoisie and he would have to be on his guard.

He was struck by the kindly Prince Lvov, who appeared to be totally uncomprehending. What war aims could we be discussing, he wondered, when the Germans are on our land? And who in the world doubts the democratic nature of our policies? Tsereteli, although a new boy here, tried immediately to puncture the egotism of that class: how was it possible not to take the mood of the people into account? If there was unrest in the factories or in the army it was only due to a lack of clarity regarding the aims of the war: everyone feared the war might be prolonged for the sake of aims that were foreign to them. The Soviet could only exert influence on the tired masses if it instilled into them the confidence that any new victims would die only to save the country, not to conquer new territories--and the government should publish a declaration on this matter, for then it would be easier too for the Soviet to mobilize workers and soldiers to defend the revolution against an outside enemy. Tereshchenko and the energetic Nekrasov said in response that they were happy to receive the Soviet''s support for national defence. And then it seemed to Tsereteli that, by saying this, Milyukov''s cabinet colleagues were already distancing themselves from him (as Kerensky put it, and publicly, the following day). But Milyukov launched into the same old song, with professorial aplomb: Russia, he said, needed to maintain the trust of its allies, and they might interpret a declaration such as the EC was demanding as the beginning of a move towards separate action on our part; and the Foreign Minister could not take on himself the responsibility for any such act. In a word, it was clear that he was not in agreement with defence alone--he wanted to grab something for Russia. But surely the ministers had to see that, logically, they could not stand their ground without an agreement with the Soviet? And Tsereteli, with new force stemming from his conviction: we are certainly not demanding steps that could lead to a rupture with the Allies.

Russia must declare that she has renounced plans for any conquests and then go to her allies with a proposal to revise their plan of action. Even if we cannot persuade them by diplomacy, we shall have some effect on them through a press campaign. Tsereteli was inspired by this vision of a way out. This was a way--unexpected, unusual, honourable--for Europe to escape from its unprecedented war! Skobelev joked, not unintelligently: "Was it not you, Pavel Nikolaevich, who, when speaking against Stürmer from the Duma platform last year, explained to us how difficult, how extraordinarily tricky and tough it had been to persuade England to acknowledge our claims on Constantinople. So why do you think they''d be so piqued if we renounced those claims now?" Milyukov countered with a reproach: the European socialists were not responding to the Manifesto. But he was not after the truth--it was only a subterfuge. "Right!" exclaimed Tsereteli, knowing how convincing he was with eyes blazing. "Right.

Let''s assume we don''t fare well in Europe--but still the whole country will pull together, and that is our greatest strength!" And now Guchkov, who had remained silent, mistrustful and hostile, said: "For the sake of army unity, I agree." Shingarev''s endorsement came from the heart: Your faith is infectious! I agree--as long as you can unite the masses behind our national defence. But can you guarantee that? He could not answer on the strength of ardour alone. Of course no one could give guarantees in advance where millions of soldiers were concerned. (Especially when we ourselves had already ruined things so--only better not say this aloud.) But the inclination of the majority among revolutionary democrats was to support it. But Milyukov alone was still refusing to budge, unmoved, uninspired. And when he dug his heels in, he could not be dislodged.

It was decided that the government would discuss the matter once more and try to formulate a declaration. Two days later the Liaison Commission went to the Mariinsky Palace again. Milyukov sat, impenetrable, while Lvov read the government''s draft declaration. It seemed right, almost, the tone was right--but. no. It avoided any clear answer on the principal point. "No nation''s patrimony to be taken from it"--that was too vague: whose patrimony was Galicia? Armenia? Maybe even Constantinople? So you must say, clearly, Russia renounces the seizure of foreign territories --full stop. Milyukov was immovable: he blocked them all.

They had, he said, already made the maximum possible concessions. And as for the point at which a direct approach is made to the Allies, the Foreign Minister must reserve that decision for himself. Fine, he could agree--it would even be better to start with a declaration, to the people, to increase enthusiasm here at home. But you must clearly renounce territorial conquests. Just when had Milyukov acquired all the techniques of a diplomat? Not a direct approach, but arrived by a roundabout route: you interpret the text your way and the Foreign Ministry in its own way. None of this doublespeak! No interpreting! We must change the direction of our foreign policy in full view of the nation! Without that correction the declaration is unsatisfactory--and we''ll make it known that the Soviet''s and the Provisional Governments'' views are unreconcilable! (excerpted from the introduction).