Table of Contents Acknowledgments deletevi Prologue 1. A Framework for Assessing Military Decisions Rating Outcomes * 7; Factors Affecting Outcomes * 10; ­Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors * 11; Informational Decisions * 19; Strategic and Tactical Considerations * 26; Chapter Recapitulation: A Framework for Understanding and Assessing ­Meta-Decisions, Situational Factors, Informational Decisions, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, and Their Consequences * 40 2. Gazala The Warring World * 45; ­Over-Promoted and ­Under-Competent: The ­Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command at Gazala * 51; "Lamentable" British Inaction "while the Russians were fighting desperately and valiantly": ­Pre-Battle Decisions * 53; Pushback to Prime Ministerial Pressure: Enabling the Axis to Move First * 55; "Seriously worried" Rommel: The Outcome of the First Two Days * 56; Baseless British Bravado, Stirring French Staunchness, and Annihilative German Efficiency: ­In-Battle Decisions Over ­Two-Plus Weeks * 57; "Tobruk must be held . and I order you to do it": ­Late-Battle Decision Reversal * 60; "Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another": Rating the Outcome * 62; At Speed into Egypt Up to a Small Depot * 63; "Killing a magnificent stag": ­Meta-Decisions on British Commands * 65; Force Strengths * 67; "Ah, now we''ve got him": Confidence and Morale * 69; "Tell[ing] a chief . the things he most likes to hear": Concentration, Reporting, Fatigue, and Luck * 71; "Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!" ­Principal-Agent Disconnect * 73; Cowpats and Concentration: Rating the ­Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command * 75; ­Meta-Decisional Query: Whose Was the "crowning blunder" That Lost 33,000 Commonwealth Soldiers at Tobruk to Captivity? * 77; "Barking out orders" versus "an awful lot of paperwork": ­Meta-Decisional Differences * 79; "Much resented": Organizational Behavior, Military Politics, and Commander Positioning * 80; "Cloud cuckoo land": Informational Delusion * 82; "Continued magnificent work": Informational Processes * 83; Negative Information Value: Misinterpretation * 85; Positive Information Value: The American Leak * 87; "But the bear blew first": ­Move-Order Decisions * 88; Deciding: Likelihoods, Values, and Aversions to Risk and Loss * 89; Conclusions * 90 3. El Alamein Prodding for Mines in Moonlight with Bayonets * 92; The ­Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon Turned Around: Battle Decisions at El Alamein * 95; "With an insubordinate smile": Montgomery Comes to the Eighth Army * 99; "A queer little bloke": Rating the ­Meta-Decisional Command Changes * 100; "Our last chance of an offensive": ­Pre-Battle Decisions at Alam Halfa * 103; "The swine isn''t attacking": ­Mid-Battle Decision at Alam Halfa * 105; "Our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone": Results and Explanations * 107; Announcing the Imminent Axis Capture of Alexandria: The ­Lead-Up to October 23 * 108; The Battle * 108; So Close to Full: "Ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this war" * 110; But Not Quite: The ­Cut-Short Cop * 111; Force Strengths: Pitchfork Against ­Tommy-Gun * 112; Probable Failure versus Assured Complete Victory: Framing the Decision on Attack Timing * 113; "Gnaw[ing] their way yard by yard": Battle Decisions of Montgomery * 115; "Military interests" versus "propaganda": Pre-and ­Mid-Battle Decisions of the Axis * 117; ­Post-Battle Decisions of Montgomery * 119; "Cautious--to my mind, excessively so": Rommel on Montgomery * 122; Was Montgomery Just "lucky . to have such immense resources?": Eighth Army Upgrades * 123; "Complete chaos existed": Informational Advantage * 123; "Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle?" Having Appropriate Resolution * 125; "As lost as a dray horse on a polo field": The Escape of Rommel''s Army * 127; "So proud of his success to date": The Behavior Respecting Risk of Montgomery * 130; Conclusions * 131 4. Falaise "Probably the most costly, controversial order given in the European theatre during World War Two" * 138; "A solid shoulder" or "a broken neck": The Decision of Bradley on August 13, 1944 * 140; Throw Them Back "into the sea": The Counterattack through Mortain * 144; Bradley as ­Second-Mover: Reacting to the Attack of Hitler at Mortain * 145; "A kick up the fork": Decisions and ­Non-Decisions of Montgomery * 148; Force Destruction versus River Crossing: The Decision of Bradley of August 14 * 150; The Outcome: "August 15 was the worst day of my [Hitler''s] life" * 151; The Long and the Short of the Hooks * 154; A Clear Allied Triumph, If Not "the greatest achievement in military history," Yet One More Incomplete Cop: Rating the Outcome * 157; "Still comparatively virgin": Explaining the Outcome * 158; "Something altogether uprooted that wanders around": Rating the Decisions on the Counterattack * 160; "An arrogant slap in the face": Reasons for Bradley''s Decision of August 13 * 161; "Patton had to be saved from himself": Assessing a Major Reason for Bradley''s Decision * 163; "Monty happily forgave us our trespasses": Assessing Other Justifications of Bradley''s Decision * 164; "A great mistake": Rating Bradley''s Decision of August 13 * 166; "Squeezing the toothpaste": Rating the Decisions on the Northern Jaw * 167; "I still don''t understand why the Allies did not crush us": Rating the Later Decisions * 168; "Who was responsible to whom": ­Meta-Decisional Muddling of Responsibility * 170; "Pay no attention to Monty''s Goddamn boundaries": Coordinational Confusion * 172; "Egregiously wrong": Inconstant Information * 174; When Were the Allied Commanders Wrong? * 176; What Would Napoleon Have Done? * 177; Conclusions * 178 ­Decision-Scientific Addendum to Chapter 4 * 182 5 Arnhem We "simply stared, stunned, like fools" * 188; "Militarily the war is won": The Decision on Arnhem * 191; The First Week: The Planning Fallacy Again * 197; "I shall probably give it up": The Decision to Retreat * 199; "Few episodes more glorious" or Jumping Off a Cliff: Ratings of the Outcome * 201; Force Strengths * 202; "Unquestionably would have been successful": Luck * 203; "Steady, Monty.

I''m your boss": ­Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors * 205; "Fantastic" Thoughts of Berlin, "lust for glory," and Interpersonal Tension * 207; "Winc[ing]" in Recognition of Stiffened Enemy Resistance * 208; Those Photographed Tanks Must Need Servicing: Informational Interpretations * 210; The Underappreciated Alternative: Taking the Scheldt * 212; "Napoleon would no doubt have realized . but Horrocks didn''t": Informational Processes * 214; "Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into [Allied headquarters] with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished": The Value of Surprise * 216; Choosing Among Alternatives: Was Arnhem, Indeed, a Bridge Too Far? * 218; Risk Aversion * 218; At a Crest at Brest: The ­Sunk-Cost Fallacy * 219; Concentration into "one really powerful and ­full-blooded thrust": Military Precepts Invoked * 223; Conclusions * 224 ­Game-Theoretic Addendum to Chapter 5 * 227 * Actual Strategic Choices * 231 Chapter Notes Bibliography Index.