Alvin E. Roth, Nir Vulkan, and Zvika Neeman: Introduction Part I: General Principles 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design? 2: Gary Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory Part II: Cases Section II.A: Matching Markets 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved? 8: Joshua Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit Section II.B: Auctions 10: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods 11: Paul Milgrom and Robert W. Day: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions 12: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton''s Ekati Diamonds Section II.C: E Commerce 13: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior 14: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents 15: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith Section II.
D: Law Design 18: Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous Preferences Part III: Experiments 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction 21: Uri Gneezy and Martin Dufwenberg: Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment 22: Elena Katok: Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments 23: Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvey: The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill Part IV: Competing Designs 24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms 25: Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan: Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets Introduction, Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman Part I: General Principles 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?, Alvin E. Roth 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior, Gary E. Bolton 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory, Paul Klemperer Part II: Cases Section II.
A: Matching Markets 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange, Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver 5. School Choice, Atila Abdulkadiroglu 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice, Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin 7. Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?, Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson 8. Designing Markets for Ideas, Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern 9. Redesigning Microcredit, Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjostrom Section II.
B: Auctions 10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods, Paul Klemperer 11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions, Robert Day and Paul Milgrom 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton''s Ekati Diamonds, Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson Section II.C: E-Commerce 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior, Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents, Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan 15.
The Design of Online Advertising Markets, Benjamin Edelman 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing, Tuomas Sandholm 17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith, Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest Section II.D: Law Design 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems, Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences, Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley Part III: Experiments 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y.
Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment, Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions, Elena Katok 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill, Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yaffe Part IV: Competing Designs 24. Competing Mechanisms, Michael Peters 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets, Nir Vulkan and Zvika Neeman.