Even without the cover provided by the militant ideologies of transformation, as in Russia and China today, the habit of justifying the abuse of power would still continue. Imperial ambition has of course rarely stepped forth in all its nakedness. Both the practitioners and the victims must hold a more palatable rationale for the violence entailed, as it was in the age of colonial empires with their mission of extending the benefits of civilization. The difference was that the latter were still anchored in the residue of classical and Christian morality that did not always bend to the convenience of those who ruled. Inflexible demands of justice and truth could not so readily be set aside for the shifting dictates of the moment. But it remained different for those who had just exited the all-purpose rationale of a great ideological system. They had not yet found their way back to the unvarying judgement of an eternal perspective. Having suppressed the voice of conscience it was difficult to hear again the voice of God.

The lie that sustained totalitarian power had become a habit that was difficult to break. But what then would provide the cover that the perpetration of evil would still need in the absence of an ideological system? Even ordinary criminals cannot sustain their criminality without invoking something high minded, whether defense of the family or the tribe or race. On the larger scale, political leaders would have to cobble fragments of ideology in order to replace the coherence that had fallen apart. It was enough that there remained the will to rationalize wrongdoing that enabled them and their supporters to stay in power. The one thing that could not be admitted was that they served only their own interests and never the common good. If nothing else, the age of ideology has heightened our awareness of the need for power to clothe itself in the trappings of higher purpose even, and especially, as the claims become increasingly threadbare. The ubiquity of justifications has been one of the indisputable additions that totalitarianism has contributed to the classical analysis of the tyrant as defined by self-interest. Violence must conceal itself with lies.

This is why in a secular age the contest between good and evil endures, for good is most needed by those who would commit evil. It turns out that we do not live in an era of sheer relativism. ''Everything is permitted'' may be displayed in our actions but we cannot admit it in what we tell ourselves. Others may be nihilistic but we must hold fast to high minded principles, even if we no longer believe in them. Indeed the imperative of moralistic stridency increases, the further we depart from moral restraints. Ideological patterns remain, even when the ideologies have waned or exhausted their appeal. The pattern is at its clearest when it comes to drawing the contrast with opponents. Even more important than the righteousness of the elect is the disdain of the reprobate.

Deplorables allow the radiant to shine. The increasing virulence of domestic politics mirrors the conflicts we see on the world scene and the source appears to be the same. It is not so much that we find ourselves in irreconcilable disagreement as that we have chosen the ideological style that allows us to vent maximum vituperation. Clashes in our imaginations have spilled over into conflicts in the streets. Indulging the politics of absolutism absolutists now find it difficult to accommodate diverse viewpoints and interests. Liberal polities teeter on the brink of illiberal politics. Cancel culture and smash-mouth rhetoric veer toward the violence that would rather silence opponents than find common ground with them. Once again we are hard pressed to explain the passionate intensity, especially in the absence of any great ideological division, and we are forced to concede that it is self-chosen for no other reason than the gratuitous satisfaction itself.

Without impassioned ideologies there remains a desire to wrap our prejudices in their all-purpose rationales. Even the liberal democracies are in worse shape by becoming susceptible to a style of ideological confrontation that will brook no compromise. Their condition too is ripe for populist demagogues to exploit. But we must not overestimate the strength of either kleptocratic or demagogic regimes. Unlike their great ideological predecessors, the roots of justification in grievance, resentment, and illegality remain precariously shallow. Rationalizations easily dissolve and the support flows quickly away once the mendacity is exposed. We are not returning to the great ideological systems that concealed wrongdoing on a mass scale from all but the most penetrating citizens. It is simply that politics has not renounced the need for fig leaves that would absolve wrongdoers of responsibility for evil or furnish bystanders with an excuse for doing nothing about it.

In other words we are back at an acknowledgement of the imperfection of political life that Augustine identified as its permanent condition. A non-utopian state no longer promises any secular prospect of perfection or transformation. Instead, threadbare rationalizations offer little more than their inability to suppress awareness of the evil they seek to conceal. Yet in invoking the hypocrisy that is the compliment vice pays to virtue they bear witness to the measure that shines undeniably above it. It is especially in the fabricated rags of ideology that the precariousness of their hold on truth becomes apparent. No matter what the coercive apparatus is, it can no longer operate in the full light of day. Criminality is exposed when nothing very exalted conceals it. A band of thieves, as Augustine observed, cannot function without justice between them.

What then is their fate when they have failed to even keep up its appearance? (excerpted from chapter 1).