Hegel's claim that his philosophy provides a theodicy tends to be dismissed as an outdated or implausible feature of his thought. Yet through a novel retelling of the development from Leibniz to Kant to Hegel, this book places that claim in a new light, showing its centrality both to Hegel's transformations of such fundamental notions as freedom and goodness, and to his understanding of the task of philosophy as such. The account begins with Leibniz's distinctively modern project of proving that the world is a hospitable home for rational subjects, before turning to Kant's critical appropriation of Leibniz's programme in light of his radical reconfiguration of freedom as autonomy. Hegel's attempt to liberate Kant's philosophy from its residual rationalist and theological commitments then gives birth to his programme of reconciling us with the world, but only by turning the prior tradition of theodicy on its head.