Introduction A rule of false logic has pervaded intellectual and philosophical methodologies, which we may call ''the rule of inevitable false dualism''. It simply involves that any philosophical question may be presented as a choice between two logical conclusions and there can be no third alternative. Debate ensues between two extreme opposites and each debater tries hard to prove their point and refute their opponent''s argument. For example, there is long-drawn debate between the advocates of objectivism, who maintain that things have natural realities that we can arrive at through consciousness, and the advocates of subjectivism, who claim that it is impossible to arrive at the reality of things. People simply have certain mental pictures of things. Each side makes certain arguments in support of their principle. We note that there are few attempts to come up with a theory that combines the facts of both sides, such as those who speak of ''a reality with a social subjectivity'' as an alternative to both views. These try to combine all that is right in all views and reconcile the seemingly contradictory arguments.

Students of philosophy argue about another supposedly inevitable dualism even though it is false, namely, the dualism of science and religion. Many people imagine that the two are mutually contradictory. Indeed, this dualism appeared in our Islamic heritage under the heading ''the contradiction between reason and revelation'' or ''the contradiction between the rational view and religious text''. This occurred in spite of the strong emphasis Islam lays on the bond between faith and intellectual reasoning, which is well known to all. Many people imagine that they have to make an inevitable choice between what belongs to religion and what belongs to science. Other correlative choices are between the material and the metaphysical; personal interest and morality; the material and the spiritual; and other opposites that are by no means mutually exclusive. Science and religion may be mutually contradictory in a particular area or dimension. For example, religion gives top position to its texts, while science accords that position to experience and observation.

However, who can say that the Islamic faith, and its central belief, is not based on experience and observation? Who can claim that intellectual consideration of scientific findings has nothing to do with the divine text? The Qur''anic method of proving God''s existence and belief - in anything - is based on observation and contemplation. God says in the Qur''an: ''Say: "Consider all that there is in the heavens and the earth."'' (10: 101) ''No fault will you see in what the Lord of Grace creates. Turn up your eyes: can you see any flaw? Then Look again, and again: your vision will come back to you dull and weary''. (67: 3-4) Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah was absolutely right when he chose for his voluminous work on logic and philosophy the title: ''Prevention of contradiction between reason and revelation, or the consistency between authentic religious texts and clearly rational views''. Moreover, religion and science are mutually complementary in several other areas, such as that both aim at the achievement of human happiness, and both attach central importance to the origin of life, the system of existence, and so on. We may also consider that mind as an abstract and as matter, which is subject to our senses, are mutually complementary, rather than contradictory. If we extend our area of consideration beyond the domain of the five senses, we realise that the most recent theories of comprehension and the brain suggest that mind and matter have mutual influence on each other.

Numerous examples of the interaction between mind and matter are given in contemporary sciences, such as having a hunch that leads to a fact without there being any material evidence pointing to it, or a dream that comes true, or the effect of spiritual and psychological factors on patients. We only need to think of the effect of ruqyah, which is a supplication, in speeding a patient''s recovery. Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh) - the different schools of which represent the philosophy of Islamic legislation - was not immune to the different philosophical systems and their false assumptions. A number of false dualisms appeared in some theories of usul al-fiqh leading to long-drawn debates and differences. Yet some scholars of legal theories were aware that it was possible in each such case to reconcile opposed views within a creative and useful framework. For example, scholars of legal theory differ concerning the acceptability of certain secondary sources as evidence or as the basis of rulings. Some would consider a certain source as acceptable evidence pointing to a particular conclusion or ruling, while others would consider it unacceptable or ''false'', in the legal theorists'' parlance. If a source of evidence is acceptable then it may serve as a basis for a ruling, while a ''false'' source is essentially unacceptable under any circumstances, and as such no ruling can be based on it.

Examples of this include al-Shafi''i''s book, Butlan al-Istihsan, or ''The invalidity of subtle analogy''; Dawud''s book, Ibtal al-Qiyas, or ''Refuting analogy''; Ibn al-Rawandi''s book, Ibtal al-Tawatur, or ''Refuting recurrence''; the disagreement between the Maliki and the Shafi''i schools on whether the actions of the people of Madinah serve as evidence for rulings or not; and the disagreement between the Zahiris, Ja''faris and Zaydis on one side and the rest of the fiqh schools on the other side on whether analogy is acceptable as evidence or not. For example, the practice or the unanimity of the people of Madinah is a full source of evidence according to the Maliki school of fiqh. Imam Malik determined many questions on its basis, such as the unanimity of the people of Madinah in explaining certain verses of the Qur''an. He considered such practice or unanimity a standard by which greater weight is given to certain hadiths of the category of ahad (narrated by single reporters). Imam al-Shafi''i rejects the very concept of giving the people of Madinah or their practice any special legislative status. He argues that it could open the door to claiming such status for the unanimity of the people of other cities.[1] Some scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, take a different view, which does not consider the question as an inevitable dualism. They accept the practice of the people of Madinah as a basis in considering certain questions, although they themselves belong to the Hanbali school of fiqh, which rejects the idea of considering such practice as a source of evidence.

Ibn Taymiyyah, for example, considers the unanimity of the people of Madinah, the Prophet''s city, as a sort of collective narration of the Prophet''s Sunnah. As such, it is treated as another narration that may even be more authentic than narrations by single reporters. This is a fine and logical solution that puts this source of evidence in a broader perspective that enables us to benefit from what is positive and useful of it, rather than confining it to the restriction of a dualism that either totally accepts or rejects it.[2] Let us take another example of false dualism from legal theory, which is known as ''the concept of opposite implications'' (mafhum al-mukhalafah). All main schools of legal theory, apart from the Hanafi school, consider the meaning of the wording of a text to be of two parts: agreement and disagreement. Thus, the concept of disagreement means that if the.