Naval Power in Action Excerpt from Chapter 1 [Fortify the nation, prepare to strike] The Chinese idiom opening this chapter is from a classic Sun Tzu script about tactical disposition. Its direct translation in short is, "first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait for an opportunity of defeating the enemy." This idiom, especially the complete section of Sun Tzu''s ancient text on tactical disposition, reflects a still- relevant discussion about the importance of military posture in waging protracted military campaigns. Today China''s acquisition of ports and naval bases overseas should likewise be seen as a competition for strategic position. This effort was first recognized in 2004 when a Booz Allen Hamilton analyst coined the term "String of Pearls" for a study of potential Chinese naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Since then, concern has only grown over where and for what purpose the Chinese Navy would seek overseas bases. In recent years the strategic implications of Chinese global dominance of ports, made more pronounced since the supply chain crises of the Covid- 19 pandemic has come into clearer focus. This concern has sharpened as Chinese leaders turn ostensibly economic interests into security presence--exemplified by China''s protestations for years that it did not seek a military base in Djibouti only for it to happen.

This has become a too familiar pattern by Beijing; deny then acquire military access to overseas bases. Since 2022, this has been playing out in the Solomon Islands and Cambodia''s port of Ream. That said, the study of Chinese overseas basing is complicated by opacity regarding their plans, activities, and official strategy. What can be seen appears to be an inconsistent Chinese Communist Party''s (CCP) military--the People''s Liberation Army (PLA)--approach to achieving global strategic position. As such, there may in fact be no formal plan but a nonlinear amalgamation of central party direction, economic profit seek- ing, and policy pragmatism guiding China''s overseas basing. However, the operational demands of being ready for a conflict over the future of Taiwan by 2027 are driving the CCP to take risks in securing a favorable strategic position. This chapter sheds light on this dynamic process in which the PLA is acquiring overseas naval bases and proposes ways to complicate it. CCP CORE INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY TOOLS TO DELIVER THEM The CCP''s often-stated long-term objective is "national rejuvenation" by its centenary in 2049.

In recent speeches, Chairman Xi Jinping has made clear this includes unification of the mainland and Taiwan as well as advancing economic prosperity.4 This does not mean war is a foregone conclusion, but domestic political pressures and recent developments in the military and economic balance may be accelerating Beijing''s desire to move sooner on the military front. If this is in fact true, there will be added pressures for the PLA to establish a favorable strategic position and secure critical energy and raw materials for the regime while presenting a daunting military obstacle to any intervention against it. If allowed to advance unabated, the CCP could soon assault Taiwan without facing an effective counterattack in what Elbridge Colby has called a fait accompli conquering of the island. This may explain recent moves to secure basing in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Moreover, tensions with the United States have grown amid economic pressures wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic and a deteriorating business environment in China. As China''s comparative advantage in cheap labor has waned, manufacturing has increasingly moved out of mainland China. A contributing factor is a worsening business environment according to a 2021 survey of European companies doing business in China.

Respondents indicated that in recent years, heightened politi- cization under Xi has caused a markedly deteriorating business environment--a trend that predated the pandemic and persists in late 2024.5 If Western companies continue to move out of China, this will place greater importance on overseas replacement sources of raw materials and markets for the CCP. This search has been assisted since 2013 by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but has in recent years been losing momentum. The strain of its debtors'' shaky financials has imperiled the $1 trillion BRI investments made by China across Africa, Latin American, and Asia. In turn, a financially overleveraged CCP could face added impetus to use its military presence to backstop compliance by strategically important CCP debtors--for example, the deep-water port Hambantota, Sri Lanka. The point is, economic and military interests are converging and incentivizing the PLA to secure more overseas bases. To achieve sustained security to the CCP''s overseas economic interests, the PLAN would need to develop new capabilities and experience operating in distant seas. Following CCP general secretary Hu Jintao''s 2004 "new historic missions" pronouncement, analysts pointed out the PLAN would need to develop platforms that could project CCP power beyond its coastal waters, new tactics, and more naval support vessels and bases to support distant operations.

7 The first tangible execution of these new missions was the December 2008 deployment of two PLAN warships and a supply ship to participate in antipiracy operations in the Horn of Africa region. After sustaining a naval presence in the region for years, in 2017 the PLA established its first and, as of August 2024, only formal overseas military base in Djibouti, where recent pier upgrades are assessed able to host the PLAN''s largest warships.9 The military value of nearby logistics demonstrated by the base in Djibouti to naval operations off the Horn of Africa likely contributed to the CCP''s 2013 decision to rapidly and massively build an archipelago of man-made islands in the South China Sea. By late 2015 the PLA had erected seven man-made islands in the South China Sea, which have since been thoroughly militarized. Subsequently, there have been frequent stops to these bases by PLAN warships, PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft, China Coast Guard (CCG) cutters, and the para- military maritime militia.10 The true value of these features is not for waging war with the United States but to sustain an economic-military campaign to exert greater control over these waters.11 It is what naval historian and researcher Hunter Stires calls "an insurgency at-sea" waged by the CCP to rewrite the norms of economic and military behavior in the region. Prior to the PLA''s construction of ports and airfields there, the CCG and PLAN were only able to maintain a limited naval presence out to one thousand miles from the nearest naval base on Hainan Island.

For the PLAN, these man-made islands provide a place to refuel, provision, and repair its warships on extended deployment, thereby freeing its limited number of logistics ships for more distant operations. The importance of these bases is greatest for sustaining a fleet of smaller CCG and maritime militia vessels far from mainland bases. For smaller patrol vessels like the PLAN''s Type-22 missile boat (also called Houbei class), coast guard cutters, and repurposed fishing vessels of the maritime militia, there is no viable at-sea replenishment option.13 However, after these forward bases were established, sustained Chinese maritime presence has skyrocketed and remains high around several key disputed features.