Figures Tables 1. Organizational Economics 1.1. A Governance Mindset 1.2. Early Contributions to Organizational Economics (with Implications for Today) 1.2.1.
Incomplete Contracts 1.2.2. Internal Organization 1.2.3. External Organization 1.2.
4. Informal Governance (Within and Between Organizations) 1.2.5. The Performance of Organizations (Within and Between Organizations) 1.2.6. Conclusion 2.
Incentives 2.1. Pay for Performance 2.1.1. The Multitask Problem--"You Get What You Pay For" 2.1.2.
Limited Liability and the Motivation-Rent Extraction Tradeoff 2.1.3. Risk Aversion and the Motivation-Risk Allocation Tradeoff 2.1.4. Moral Hazard in Teams 2.2.
Incentive Systems 2.3. Incentives Beyond Formal Instruments--Career Concerns 2.4. Conclusion 2.5. Problems 3. Control 3.
1. A Framework and a Benchmark 3.2. The Adaptation Model 3.3. The Property-Rights Model 3.4. Control under Asymmetric Information 3.
4.1. The Adaptation Model with Asymmetric Information 3.4.2. The Delegation Model 3.5. Conclusion 3.
6. Problems 4. Influence 4.1. Strategic Communication 4.1.1. Cheap Talk Can Be Credible When Preferences Are Partially Aligned 4.
1.2. Verifiable Information May be Selectively Disclosed in Equilibrium 4.1.3. Costly Messages can Credibly Signal Private Information 4.2. Strategic Information Management 4.
2.1. (Bayesian) Persuasion through Public Information Structures 4.2.2. Information Structures That Are Costly to Manipulate 4.3. Organizational Responses to Influence 4.
3.1. Delegation as a Response to Strategic Communication? 4.3.2. Limiting Discretion to Manage Influence Costs 4.4. Conclusion 4.
5. Problems 5. Relationships 5.1. Relational Incentive Contracts 5.2. Dynamic Enforcement in Richer Environments 5.2.
1. Relational Adaptation 5.2.2. Imperfect Public Monitoring 5.2.3. Multiple Agents 5.
3. Formal Governance Shapes Relational Contracts 5.3.1. Allocating Control to Manage Reneging Temptations 5.3.2. The Interaction of Formal and Relational Incentive Contracts 5.
4. The Burden of Past Promises 5.4.1. Why Stationarity? 5.4.2. Imperfect Transfers and Backloading 5.
4.3. Uncoordinated Punishments 5.5. Conclusion 5.6. Problems 6. Personnel 6.
1. Hiring 6.2. Skill Development 6.2.1. The Becker Problems: Who Pays for Training? 6.2.
2. Selling General-Purpose Skills Through Apprenticeships 6.2.3. Motivating Firm-Specific Skills with Wage Schedules 6.3. Job Assignments 6.3.
1. Wage and Promotion Dynamics 6.3.2. Promotions Signal Productivity to the Labor Market 6.3.3. Slot-Constrained Promotion Opportunities 6.
4. Conclusion 6.5. Problems 7. Real Authority 7.1. Sources of Influence 7.1.
1. Influence from Expertise 7.1.2. Influence from Inspiration 7.1.3. Influence over a Group 7.
2. Sources of Leverage 7.2.1. Implementation Leverage 7.2.2. Cooperative Leverage 7.
2.3. Retaliatory Leverage 7.2.4. Indirect Leverage 7.3. Conclusion 7.
3.1. Politics 7.3.2. Coalitions 7.3.3.
Power 7.4. Problems 8. Structure 8.1. Hierarchies 8.1.1.
Decision-Making Hierarchies Economize on Information Costs 8.1.2. Monitoring Hierarchies Provide an Efficient Way to Scale 8.1.3. Knowledge Hierarchies Leverage Expertise 8.2.
Divisionalization 8.2.1. Task Grouping in Functional versus Multidivisional Organizations 8.2.2. Internal Capital Markets 8.2.
3. Transfer Pricing 8.3. Conclusion 8.4. Problems 9. Boundaries 9.1.
Payoff Rights 9.1.1. Choosing the Residual Claimant 9.1.2. An Incentive-System Model of Firm Boundaries 9.2.
Control Rights 9.2.1. An Adaptation Model of Firm Boundaries 9.2.2. A Property-Rights Model of Firm Boundaries 9.3.
An Influence-Cost Model of Firm Boundaries 9.4. Connections with Classics 9.4.1. Ex Post Versus Ex Ante Inefficiencies 9.4.2.
Specific Investments 9.4.3. Forbearance 9.4.4. The Make-or-Buy Problem? 9.5.
Conclusion 9.6. Problems 10. Non-Integration 10.1. Bilateral Interactions 10.1.1.
Joint Ventures 10.1.2. Standard-Setting Organizations 10.1.3. Strategic Alliances 10.2.
Polycentric Governance 10.2.1. Supplier Pools 10.2.2. Institutions 10.2.
3. Communities 10.3. Conclusion 10.4. Problems 11. Frontiers 11.1.
Recent Empirical Intersections Between OE and Applied Microeconomics 11.2. Potential Intersections Between OE and Other Disciplines 11.3. Management 11.4. Persistent Performance Differences 11.5.
Building a Shared Narrative 11.6. Societal Culture and Organizational culture Game Theory Appendix References Index.